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THE ORATORY OF BARRY GOLDWATER 
Professor Andrew Taylor, University of Sheffield 
Introduction 
Any discussion of Barry Goldwater’s rhetoric must address a paradox. In 1964 Goldwater 
experienced one of the biggest defeats in American electoral history. Lyndon Johnson won 61 
percent of the popular vote, Goldwater 38.4 percent; Johnson won 486 electoral college votes, 
Goldwater just 52, winning only Arizona (his home state) and five Southern states (Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina). Given that Goldwater stood on an unequivocally 
conservative platform his defeat was almost universally interpreted as the electorate’s rejection of 
conservatism. Rhetorically Goldwater is best remembered for thirty words in his 1964 speech 
accepting his party’s presidential nomination. Notwithstanding, Goldwater’s ideas and supporters 
remained influential and these ideas achieved dominance amongst Republicans culminating in the 
nomination of Ronald Reagan. Goldwater’s ideas remained central to GOP ideology Goldwater’s 
rhetoric was clearly an electoral failure but extremely successful in helping forging a conservative 
constituency. 
Goldwater’s rhetoric failed as electoral persuasion but succeeded as political mobilisation (Taylor 
2016, 242-260). How can we explain the same rhetoric producing different outcomes? Two factors 
seem particularly relevant: time and speaker’s character. In 1964 Goldwater was before his time and 
the long-term influence of his ideas rested on the passage of time and emerging phenomena 
including anti-war protests, economic problems, and  growing dissatisfaction with America’s political 
institutions that rendered Goldwater’s ideas infinitely more acceptable to more voters. Second, 
Goldwater’s character – frequently described as rugged individualism -- was seen by many 
conservatives as appropriate to his message but not so by voters (Hammerback 1972, 175-183). 
Ronald Reagan, articulating Goldwater’s ideas and benefitting from events, proved a far more 





Goldwater’s ideas; second,it considers Goldwater’s rhetorical strategy; and third, it explores the 
politics of Goldwater’s rhetoric. The paper concludes that irrespective of his rhetorical and political 
shortcomings Barry Goldwater is one of the most effective rhetoricians in American political history. 
Goldwater’s rhetoric: content 
Goldwater rhetoric was, and is, criticised as a divisive, polarising figure which is precisely what he 
intended. Karl Hess saw winning elections as secondary to establishing a clear choice between 
political philosophies (1967, 23-4). Covering some 13 states and 10,000 miles a month on behalf of 
the Senate Republican Committee giving more-or-less the same speech, allied to his syndicated Los 
Angeles Times column and his 1960 book The Conscience of a Conservative made Goldwater the 
most visible and influential conservative politicians. He could be a remarkably effective speaker. 
Shadegg reported he ‘had seen Goldwater tame a hostile audience with his reasonable, friendly 
responses to antagonistic questions. I had watched him develop a consistent, and to my mind, 
appealing conservative political philosophy. He possessed ... that quality of charisma which enables a 
speaker to rouse a crowd to wild enthusiasm’ (Shadegg 1965, 5). He was seen by many as offering ‘a 
new rhetoric, new tactics, new emphases’ (Bozell 1960, 74) but the critical words are ‘to my mind’ 
and Goldwater’s problem was the transition from the GOP’s rubber-chicken circuit to electioneering. 
Goldwater spoke to Republicans and ordinary voters via the same intellectual prism and using the 
same language and one of the reasons he was transformative in grassroots Republican politics was 
that his message was constantly and consistently reiterated before sympathetic audiences. 
However, what was a largely unmediated message in Republican politics was filtered by the media in 
the election and this transformed Goldwater’s strengths into serious weaknesses (Perlstein 2009, 
456). 
Whatever his technical weaknesses as an orator and candidate he did evoke an enthusiatic response 
from audiences attuned to his ideas. Central to his style was a determination to tell voters what 





willingness to answer any questions put to him by journalists with little thought given to the 
consequences. Goldwater hoped this style reflected the seriousness of the Republic’s plight and that 
voters would draw the correct conclusions. His determination not to be ensnared by the 
compromises of electioneering and make 1964 a clear choice between competing political 
philosophies sometimes led to a failure to ‘read’ an event and resulted in a public relations disaster. 
His tendency to ‘shoot from the hip’ which evoked widly differing responses (his proposal to sell the 
TVA for $1 evoked both derision and enthusiasm) and about which he was warned. Advisers (for 
example, in the New Hampshire primary that Goldwater lost) argued for greater message discipline, 
which Goldwater largely ignored (There were also amateur mistakes. For example, an official portrait 
has him with his spectacles askew). Goldwater’s advisers recognised his oratory generated powerful 
reactions, ‘Throughout his political life, and particularly during the 1964 presidential campaign, 
politicians attached to Goldwater winced at his blunt speech, his willingness to take a stand on any 
issue, his doing the unnecessary, his saying things that need not have been said’ (Shadegg 1967, 
26).1 Middendorf conceded Goldwater ‘was often an inept campaigner, irritable and impatient. But 
he so much wanted to get his message across in an unvarnished way, “shooting from the hip” was 
practically a campaign theme’ (Middendorf 2006, xi). The problem was that Goldwater’s candour 
and honesty was central to his image, persona, and appeal as a candidate, but by early-1964 
                                                          
1
  Goldwater appointed close friends, known as the Arizona Mafia, to run his campaign, 
‘Goldwater for President’. This group included, for example, Denison Kitchelt, Dean Burch, 
William Baroody and Edward McCade who had no experience of running a national campaign. 
The Draft Goldwater Committee, which contained seasoned political professionals such as 
Clifton White, William Rusher, and J. William Middendorf were ignored or sidelined. This 
included speechwriters. There seems little doubt that a lack of expertise led Goldwater to 
commit a number of errors with regard to messaging but equally it is clear Goldwater was 





Goldwater’s favourable coverage evaporated as he came under media scrutiny, a great deal of which 
was unfair.  The 1964 Republican convention at the Cow Palace, San Francisco, was critical in fixing 
Goldwater’s image. The silencing of Rockefeller by Goldwater  supporters and the perceived 
extremism of his acceptance speech both of which were broadcast live on tv and did much to fix his 
extremist image in the public mind (see Skipper 2016 for a recent account). Goldwater came over to 
many in the electorate as unpleasant and frightening. 
Kennedy’s assassination and Johnson’s emergence meant the prospect of an effective 
Conservative/GOP electoral challenge faded; Republican divisions at the San Francisco convention 
and Goldwater’s statements gave Democrats all the ammunition they needed for devastating assault 
(see, for instance, Mann 2011, 83-102, and Johnson 2009, 199-247). Goldwater’s objective in 1964 
was to re-establish two-party competition with each party representing distinct ideologies and 
thereby offering voters a clear political choice so laying the foundations for conservative growth 
(Hess 1967, 39-42). Goldwater had long deprecated the decline of party competition because ‘we 
cannot longer [sic] win elections ... by playing the role of a political Santa Claus? ... The attempt to be 
all things to all men is a frail admission that, each in our own philosophies of government, has not 
sufficient substance or competence to serve the Nation well and in accordance with constitutional 
standards’ (Goldwater 1957, 5261). As party competition declined, political choice narrowed and 
policy degenerated; party politics were now built around an unstable and leftwards-moving ‘centre’ 
that ineluctably led to political parties abandoning principle. Southern voters were in the vanguard 
of political change because ‘realizing that they cannot live under a single-party system; that they 
have to have a two-party system; that there has to be competition between the parties all over this 
country’ they were moving away from the Democrats. Without party and ideological competition 
government would not be restrained (Goldwater 1961a, 17642). Differentiation was absolutely 
fundamental because ‘If the “out” party cannot or will not grit its teeth and dig in for the long hard 
fight ... then it will become a non-party. ... Politics, then, ceases to be partisan ... Nothing changes 





freedom because it institutionalised one-party rule and ensured the Republican Party became ‘an 
annex of the Democratic Party ... dedicated to the same programs under different personalities’ 
(Hess 1967, 158). By the late-1950s/early-1960s disaffection with the New Deal consensus, social 
and geographical change and Goldwater’s proselytising meant a conservative insurgency was taking-
off (see for example Andrew 1997; Schneider 1999; Schoenwald 2011; and Gifford 2009). 
The foundation of his rhetoric was a profound hostility to government as the  threat to individual 
liberty, 
More and more Americans are beginning  to understand that all forms government other 
than the governments of free men, require central control to become effective. This is a 
common and an absolutely necessary ingredient of government collectivism. I don’t care 
whether we call it communism, socialism, Fabianism, the welfare state, the planned 
economy, the New Deal, Fair Deal or the New Frontier (Goldwater 1961a, 17643). 
From Goldwater’s perspective all state intervention promoted collectivism, the enemy of choice and 
therefore freedom, 
I suggest that if you must choose, it is better to be poor and free than to be snug and a 
slave. 
I suggest that if you must choose, it is better to live in peril, but with justice, than to live on 
a summit of material power, but unjustly. 
I suggest that if you must choose, it is better to stand up as a suffering man than to lie 
down as a satisfied animal (Goldwater 1962a, 2059). 
Republicans would win only if conservative principles offered ‘a clear-cut choice’ between ‘the 
paternalistic super-state with its ever increasing spending and its ever-increasing taxation and its 





which the people can assert their sovereignty over government’ (Goldwater 1960a,7. See also 
Annunziata 1980).  
Goldwater’s vision demanded  a new kind of politician, which is captured in the credo in The 
Conscience of a Conservative, 
I have little interest in streamlining government or in making it more efficient, for I mean to 
reduce its size. I do not undertake to promote welfare, for I propose to extend freedom. 
My aim is not to pass laws but to repeal them. It is not to inaugurate new programs, but to 
cancel old ones that do violence to the Constitution, or that have failed in their purpose, or 
that impose on the people an unwarranted financial burden. I will not attempt to discover 
whether legislation is ‘needed’ before I have first determined it is constitutionally 
permissible. And if I should later be attacked for neglecting my constituents’ ‘interests,’ I 
shall reply that I was informed their main interest is liberty and that in that cause I am 
doing the very best I can (Goldwater 2013, 13).  
Government was the threat to freedom and government’s ‘only proper role’ was protecting the 
Republic’s ‘traditions and principles, its institutions of religious liberty, of educational and economic 
opportunity, of Constitutional rights, of the integrity of the law, [which] are the most precious 
possession of the human race’ (Goldwater 1961b, 9952). The American ideal was not ‘to become 
bigger, fatter, and more luxurious ... Are we really nothing better than materialists?’ Goldwater 
declared, ‘I do not believe that any mere standard of living, in itself, is worth dying for’; America, he 
continued, ‘has for its moral object the high dignity of man; and for its political aim, ordered 
freedom – liberty under God and under the law – with justice for all.’ He concluded, ‘If it comes to 
the test we ought to die rather than to submit to a collectivist anthill, no matter how glistening or 





The Eisenhower administration’s 1957 budget  was described by Goldwater as ‘a betrayal of the 
people’s trust’ and ‘government by bribe’ that ensured a loss of freedom: ‘our people do need to be 
inspired – inspired in the way of helping themselves unimpeded by Government ... inspired by the 
conviction that the Federal Government gives to the people nothing which it does not first take from 
them.’ High taxation and budget deficits meant ‘the United States can spend itself out of existence 
as a free and sovereign nation.’ The erosion of economic strength meant the erosion of all other 
defences and individual protections in the face of centralised government whose rise heralded the 
end of the American constitutional order. The Eisenhower administration ‘instead of following its 
original campaign pledges, simply parrot the antics of its predecessor against which it labored so 
loud and justly in 1952’ (Goldwater 1957, 5259 and 5260). This road would culminate in the demise 
of American democracy. 
His speech to the Republican Women’s Convention, ‘No Time for Timid Souls’ (Prescott, Arizona 3 
May 1958), argued the Depression had brought to power a class of individuals hostile to the 
American way. The solutions to all America’s problems would come from ‘the small towns ... from 
the men and women who look up from the toil of their day to day labors toward a better world...’ 
but ‘you and I are caught like a shuttlecock in a badmington game between the power plays of 
ambitious men’ (Goldwater 1958a, 8355). Freedom was threatened because government had 
‘subscribed to that ancient fallacy that a powerful central government could do more for man than 
man could for himself’ and 
after 25 years of meddling and tinkering with the basic concepts of the Constitution with 
our ancient understandings of the position of a free man in a free society, and with our 
constant increasing dependence upon a central authority, in business and in labor and in 
government, the face of America’s main street has changed (Goldwater 1958a, 8355). 
Americans confronted a ‘paternalisitic and collective administrative dictatorship’ offering voters the 





responsibilities’ (Goldwater 1958a, 8356). Speaking at Flint, Michigan, Goldwater warned of ‘the 
constant interference of professional politicians’ that ‘dulled and demoralized’; these ‘demagogs and 
their Communist allies ... still mouthing the cliches of the thirties’ represented the most significant 
threat to the United States. The conservatives’ task was to ‘drag them kicking and screaming into the 
second half of the 20th Century’ (Goldwater 1961c, 7593-7594).  
An example of Goldwater’s ideological consistency and willingness to be be unpopular was his 
opposition Federal education funding. Responding to  a Senate debate, Goldwater declared ‘I did not 
hear anything then, I have not heard anything since, to convince me that the Federal Government 
should put another one of its meddling fingers into the affairs of the States by sticking it into the 
educational system, a responsibility of the States’ (Goldwater 1958b, 17291-17292). Federal funding 
was unconstitutional and Federal interference testified to the contempt in which the Constitution 
was now held:  
Federal aid for schools, for any purpose, is morally and legally wrong because it will lead to 
Federal control ... Nowhere in the Constitution is Congress given permission to tax and 
spend for the Nation’s schools ... If Federal aid to education is imposed, it eventually will ... 
make collectivized captives of our children (Goldwater 1958b, 17293). 
‘I am not’, Goldwater lamented, ‘very proud of the Republican Party tonight’ and concluded that the 
best thing ‘I can do for my community, my State, my country ... is to see to it that Federal aid to 
education receives a decided setback ...’ (Goldwater 1958b, 17294 and 17295). 
A similar attitude characterised Goldwater’s response to civil rights legislation. Whilst personally 
opposed to discrimination and segregation, Goldwater interpreted the Civil Rights Act (1964) 
through the lens of burgeoning Federal power and regulation. Despite conceding a role for Federal 
legislation in promoting legal equality he believed that Title II (public accommodation) and Title VII 





dispose of, private property. This liberty was the foundation of freedom and so Titles II and VII  
posed ‘a grave threat to the very essence of our basic system of government’ (Goldwater 1964a, 
14319). So radical were Titles II and VII, their objectives ought only to be realised by a constitutional 
amendment for to do otherwise ‘is to act in a manner which could ultimately destroy the freedom of 
all American citizens, including the freedom of the very persons whose feelings and whose liberties 
are the major subject of this legislation’. Regulating private property rights to the degree sought by 
the bill would ‘require the creation of a Federal police force of mammoth proportions’ relying on an 
‘“informer” psychology’ creating a police state (Goldwater 1964a, 14319). The cure was, in  
Goldwater’s view, worse than the disease. 
A key feature of Goldwater’s politics was his anti-communism and hostility to the USSR. The USA 
should not shrink from confrontation with the USSR even at the risk of nuclear war because ‘our 
national existence is once again threatened as it was in the early days of the Republic’ by ‘alien 
forces’.  This had reached the point at which 
American leaders, both political and intellectual, are searching desperately for means of 
“appeasing” or “accomodating” the Soviet Union as the price of national survival. The 
American people are being told that, however valuable their freedom may be, it is even 
more important to live. A craven fear of death is entering the American consciousness...  
(Goldwater 1960b, 5571. Emphasis added). 
The USSR, unlike the USA, was determined to win the Cold War; ‘We must – as the first step toward 
saving American freedom – affirm the contrary view and make it the cornerstone of our foreign 
policy: that we would rather die  than lose our freedom’ (Goldwater 1960b, 5572. Emphasis added). 
America’s ‘ultimate objective’ was ‘a world in which there is the largest possible measure of freedom 
and justice and peace and material prosperity’ but this was unattainable ‘without the prior defeat of 





(Goldwater 1961d, 582). America’s commitment to winning the Cold War had declined precipitately 
and would continue to decline to the point where the country was ‘isolated and besieged by an 
entirely hostile world.’ Therefore, ‘We will have to shed the attitudes of and techniques of the 
Salvation Army and start behaving like a great power’ because ‘This sluggish sentimentality, this 
obsession for pleasing people, has become a matter of grand strategy; has become no less than the 
guiding principle of American policy’(Goldwater 1961d, 585). One response was to ‘encourage the 
captive peoples to revolt against their Communist rulers. This policy must be pursued with caution 
and prudence  as well as courage’ but ‘we would invite the Communist leaders to choose between 
the total destruction of the Soviet Union, and accepting a local defeat’ (Goldwater 1961d, 585).  
From this brief survey it is clear how radical was Goldwater’s rhetoric and how it brought him into 
conflict with large sections of the political establishment and electorate. 
Goldwater’s rhetorical strategy 
Eisenhower’s victory in 1952, made the him the first Republican president since Hoover,  but his 
espousal of Modern Republicanism infuriated conservatives like Goldwater (Donaldson 2014, 120-
122). Modern Republicanism sought to combine fiscal conservatism and social liberalism but 
Goldwater argued Eisenhower’s administration was a failure because it preserved the New Deal.  
However, Republican losses in 1956 and in the 1958 mid-terms and the liberal-Republican 
stranglehold on the party’s nominating process created space for a new articulation of conservatism 
emerging from the the mid-West, California, and the South.  Goldwater’s dislike of the 
Administration’s policies was tempered by his party loyalty but he launched his insurgency on 8 April 
1957 with a critique of the Administration’s budget in the Senate. The Republican and Democrat 
parties were 
peddlers  of the philosophy that the Constitution is outmoded, that States rights are void, 
and that the only hope for the future of these United States is for our people to be 





in their occupations, and to die a Federal death, thereafter to be buried in a Federal box in 
a Federal cemetery (Goldwater 1957, 5260). 
Republicans were equally culpable, 
we have been so thoroughly saturated with the New Deal doctrine of big, squanderbust 
government, that, as a party, we Republicans have on more than one occasion shown 
tendencies to bow to the siren song of socialism and, instead of hurling a challenge against 
the ravages of the pseudo-liberals amongst us, have accepted their doctrines, lock, stock, 
and barrel, saying only “we can do it better” (Goldwater 1957, 5261).  
Modern Republicanism meant, therefore, that whichever party was in office, the Democrats 
remained in power. The GOP lost its political distinctiveness and buttressed the status quo (‘the 
socialistic Republicrats’, ‘dime-store New Dealers’, ‘me-tooism’, ‘country club Republicans’). In 1958 
Goldwater complained, 
We are putting a Federal crutch under the arms of the people. We are taking away the 
bootstraps which Americans once grasped firmly and pulled on to make something out of 
themselves. We are instilling in the American people the desire to rely upon the Federal 
Government for everything they need and do (Goldwater 1958b, 17924). 
Goldwater complained of America’s infantilisation and transformation into ‘a national wet nurse – 
dispensing a cockeyed kind of patent medicine labeled “Something for Nothing”, passing out 
soothing syrup and pacifiers in return for grateful votes on election day’ (Goldwater 1960a, 6). 
Contemplating the 1960 presidential election Goldwater wrote in his journal that since 1940 
Republicans ‘have had nothing but “me-tooism” ’ and he feared ‘another seizure of “me-tooism” ... 
To me this is a certainty ... what we have offered the people and what the Vice President (Richard 
Nixon) apparently wants to take as his stock in trade is a dime-store new deal’ (Dean and Goldwater 





which were little more than hollow echoes of the siren songs of the welfare staters’ (Goldwater 
1960a, 6).  
These attacks, his 1958 victory in Arizona, his anti-communism , and feud with the UAW’s Walter 
Reuther (“I would rather have Jimmy Hoffa stealing my money than Walter Reuther stealing my 
Freedom.”) on the McLellan Committee, transformed Goldwater into the national advocate of a new 
conservative vision (see Shermer 2008, 678-709 for the role of labour in Goldwater’s rise). This vision 
and message resonated powerfully and Goldwater, as the chair of the Senate Republican Campaign 
Committee, travelled the country outlining his conservatism to enraptured audiences (Perlstein 
2009, 46; Donaldson 2003, 59-60).  From January 1960 Shadegg ghosted Goldwater’s thrice weekly 
column, ‘How Do You Stand, Sir?’, in The Los Angeles Times, which became the fastest growing 
feature in the history of the Time-Mirror Syndicate, eventually appearing in over 150 newspapers 
across America. Clarence Manion, the former dean of Notre Dame law school and an uber-
conservative activist, suggested that Goldwater publish a statement of his views. The Conscience of a 
Conservative, was drafted by Brent R. Bozell, a founder and editor of the National Review with W.F. 
Buckley,  who was also Buckley’s brother-in-law and a Goldwater speech writer. The Conscience of a 
Conservative was written with Goldwater’s full collaboration and enjoyed huge sales and massive 
distribution thanks to wealthy conservative donors. Goldwater became the acknowledged leader of 
the conservative movement whose ideology emphasised the absolute centrality of freedom and 
identfied the Constitution as the expression and defence of freedom and from this Goldwater 
derived his critique of contemporary politics. This critique condemned the New Deal, its successors 
and its imitators, the decline of laisser-faire, high taxation, federal spending and budget deficits, the 
erosion of states’ rights and burgeoning Federal power, the growth of special interests, the growth 
of welfarism, and the domestic and international communist threat. With the publication of 






Sections of public opinion already dissented from the New Deal-consensus and so Goldwater was 
both a symptom and cause of ‘the growing strength of the conservative mobilization in the 1940s, 
1950s, and 1960s’ (Phillips-Fein 2011, 726). This was, in part, the product of the shifting geographical 
and social bases of the ‘new’ conservatism. This included the prosperous, upwardly mobile, white, 
Democrats who had moved to the suburbs or growth hubs such as Orange County in California, 
Goldwater’s own Phoenix in Arizona, and the Southwest generally (see, Schuparra 1992; Schuppara 
1998; and McGirr 2001);  the ex-Democratic voting, white ethnic group backlash (for example 
Nicolaides 2002; Durr 2007; and Self 2005); and the South, which had been moving Republican since 
1952 (see, Crespino 2009; Lowndes 2008; and Lassiter 2006). Stewart Alsop concluded that 
‘Whereever there is a lot of new money ... the West and Southwest, in Texas, in the newly 
industrialized South – there is fanatical Goldwater support’ (Alsop 1964; also Crespi 1965). 
Goldwaterism’s social and geographic base offered the prospect of a conservative winning in 1964 
without the ground-zero of liberal Republicanism, the North-East (Rusher 1963). The central purpose 
of Goldwater’s rhetoric was to draw these people together and mobilise them around his conception 
of conservatism. 
Selecting a relatively small number of speeches from a far larger body of work inevitably raises 
questions about the reasons for selection and the representativeness of the selected cases. 
Definitive texts of the many hundreds of speeches given to coutnless audiences do not exist; many 
speeches were closer to the extemporaneous and Goldwater was not a fan of the fixed-text speech, 
preferring to draw on themes such as the family, taxation, deficits, the USSR, labour relations,  and 
so on. The speeches analysed here were selected because, first, they deal with themes identified by 
Goldwater himself as absolutely central to his stance; and second, they are united by a common 
argumentation and in many cases by style. Their significance is further demonstrated by the fact that 
many were read into the Congressional Record either by Goldwater or sympathetic fellow senators. 
Others are significant because of where they were given and the audience addressed. Taken 





delivered by Goldwater this paper analyses the 1957 Senate speech attacking budget deficits,  the 
‘No Time for Timid Souls’ speech (a peaen to the virtues of small-town America),  the 1958 speech 
opposing federal education funding,  the Air War College speech,  and the speech opposing the 1964 
civil rights act.  Of Goldwater’s writings I have omitted Why Not Victory?, a foreign policy study that 
repeats at greater length statements and sentiments found elsewhere but include The Forgotten 
Americans.  Conceived of as ‘A Statement of Proposed Republican Principles, Programs and 
Objectives’ (also included), which was intended as a ‘stem-to-stern Republican legislative agenda for 
the 1960s’ but Goldwater’s interest quickly faded away (Perlstein 2009, 138). Goldwater’s speech to 
a Republican Fund Raiser at Flint, Michigan, provides concise statement of Goldwater’s views and is 
included as an instance of his ‘standard’ speech.  ‘A Statement of Proposed Republican Principles, 
Programs and Objectives’ represents, however, an extended statement of a putative Goldwaterite 
conservative governing project that supplements The Conscience of a Conservative (also included), 
itself a distillation of his years on the Republican rubber chicken circuit and which is of lasting 
significance (Regnery 2014). The final source used is Goldwater’s speech to the 1964 convention 
accepting the Republican presidential nomination, which represents the summation of Goldwater’s 
rhetorical effort (Goldwater 1964b).  
Figure 1 gives the tag cloud for the texts and Table 1 the number and percentage of word usage. The 
tag cloud is a visual representation of the frequency (and therefore significance) of the ideas and 
concepts used in the texts that were characteristic of Goldwater’s speaking and writing and which 
enthused so many audiences. What matters, however, is not the words and concepts per se but their 
combination and consequent meaning within the message’s structure and objective. Thus, ‘federal’ 
and ‘government’ were presented as a negative by a conservative and a positive by a liberal; 
everyone favours ‘freedom’ but (as Isaiah Berlin showed) freedom can be defined as either negative 
or positive.  





<Table 1 here> 
In the frequency count ‘government’ and ‘federal’ are the most numerous and are the antithesis of 
‘people’ and ‘freedom’; similarly, ‘american’ and ‘states’ signal the importance of both unity and 
diversity in Goldwater’s thinking and their antithesis is, of course, ‘communism’ that represents the 
regimented other, against which Americans must be ‘united’ to defeat communism at home and 
abroad. This also captured the proper distribution of political power. ‘Federal’, ‘freedom’ and ‘states’ 
is a significant combination in Goldwater’s discourse as it is a proxy for states rights, which was itself 
a proxy for Southern (and increasingly, Northern) hostility to civil rights and support for segregation. 
An appeal to the South was central to Goldwater’s strategy in 1964 (‘hunting where the ducks are’) 
and whatever Goldwater’s personal convictions about segregation and discrimination this was an 
appeal addressed to those fearful of civil rights and African-American advancement inside (and 
outside) the South. A visible and significant word is ‘should’. ‘Should’ is a modal verb expressing 
duty, identifying (or suggesting) the best or correct thing to do and is related intimately to ‘ought’, 
with its strong imputation of moral duty (should = ‘do the right thing’). ‘Should’ suggests that a 
situation exists, or could come into existence, and therefore indicates both purpose and response. It 
is an extremely significant word, indicating a moral imperative, the reason for a conservative 
insurgency and the urgent need for change, connoting a duty to transform politics, policy and the 
polity. In the final section we consider how this message was articulated. 
The Politics of Goldwater’s Oratory 
One of the intruiging unknowns of the 1964 election  is the effect of Kennedy’s assassination on 
Goldwater’s oratory. As senators Kennedy and Goldwater were on friendly terms and Goldwater 
refers to a proposal to stage a campaign of ideas modelled on the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas debates. 
This would be ‘a direct and decisive confrontation between antagonistic political philosophies – the 
welfare state, represented by the Democrats, and a society of free independent, responsible 





‘We knew that Barry was looking forward to challenging Kennedy on the issues’  (2006, 61-2). This 
was ended by the assassination as well as Goldwater’s defects as a candidate. 
The assassination changed the perception of extremism into a right-wing/conservative problem and 
triggered a crisis of confidence in Goldwater, who also accepted Johnson could not be defeated. 
Trapped in, and obligated to,  what now seemed failing candidacy his doubts were reinforced as 
favourable media coverage evaporated. Goldwater believed he had developed an effective method 
of communication: ‘in my contacts  with people I am always amazed that a careful study and a 
decent explanation of my conservative position melts away and rabid opposition that would be 
there were I merely to attack liberalism without explaining Conservatsim’ (Dean and Goldwater 
2008, 112). The ideas that fuelled his rhetoric did not change but there were differences between 
how campaign and non-campaign speeches were put together.  Reflecting on addressing myriad 
Republican audiences, he wrote, ‘Most of my speeches are extemporaneous, based on hastily 
written notes’ (often on the back of napkins)  and ‘I try to guage the interest and temper of my 
audience and fashion my words accordingly’ (Goldwater 1980, 335). For more ‘formal’ speeches 
Goldwater would discuss ideas with speechwriters who would then recast these thoughts into 
Goldwater’s idiom who would then rework these in ways that satisfied his purposes and character. 
Goldwater, however, cared little about rhetorical construction.  Perlstein, for example, reports Hess 
and Goldwater ‘fantasied about barnstorming the nation ... Together they wrote speeches that were 
like bill boards on the road to Damascus ... some few voters who entered the hall seeking just 
enough info to pull one lever ... were converted in a blinding flash.’ There was, however, a downside,  
‘Many more were just spooked’ (2009, 315). There was nothing particularly unusual about the way 
Goldwater’s speeches were developed. Speechwriting ‘was neither an individual nor a team effort; it 
was more like a serial exposition. One or two men would write a draft, another would make changes, 
et another would bring his own ideas into the mix before the text was turned over to the blue-pencil 





Henry Jaffa, who contributed to Goldwater’s 1964 convention speech, was never given the 
opportunity to discuss the ideas to be covered in a speech. Whilst this introduced an element of 
uncertainty into speechwriting it allowed Goldwater to alter speeches but his weaknesses as a 
candidate meant his rhetoric was increasingly reactive and directionless. Thus, ‘Barry had no 
schedule – he just seemed to “poop along” ... There was no plan, no correlation and a lot of wasted 
opportunity’ (Middendorf 2006, 50) with him relying on his reputation for candour. This, however, 
was a wasting and dangerous asset. This approach worked well in the Senate and with audiences of 
conservative activists and supporters but less well with reporters and uncommitted voters, and the 
problem was compounded by Goldwater’s  hostility to ‘Madison Avenue’ techniques. One month 
before November 1964 professional political operatives from the Draft Goldwater Committee 
argued Goldwater should adopt a more professional approach to speech-writing by putting Stephen 
Shadegg in charge, a proposal that was blocked by Kitchel and Baroody (members of the Arizona 
Mafia), and Goldwater showed little interest largely because he was by now convinced defeat was 
inevitable. In 1963 Middedorf noted Goldwater ‘expressed the wish that our movement be not 
expressly to make him President, but to expand and foster the conservative movemement in the US 
through the Republican Party’ (Middendorf 2006, 30).   
Goldwater’s aim, remember, was not so much an electoral  platform but delivering a stark warning  
abour growing Federal power. As he told Shadegg in January 1960, 
We can do this in a philosophical way, then we can detach the definitiion and exposition to 
the concrete subject of legislation. We should constantly bring out in this respect that the 
liberals of today, using the approach of belly-politics and social welfare, are in effect doing 
presicely  those things that our Constitution and our free enterprise system was designed 
to prevent  (Dean and Goldwater 2008, 111). 
As we have seen, central to Goldwater’s understanding of rhetoric was a deep conviction that a clear 





words, believed strongly in the power of logos but this is not the case because logos was 
supplemented by, and usually outflanked by those and pathos, which lay at the heart of his speaking 
in the GOP and the 1964 campaign. The most visible aspect of Goldwater’s rhetoric, however, was 
pathos. Goldwater’s message honed before a variety of audiences was built around five elements: 
first, the foundational primacy of individual freedom; second, reverence for the Constitution and its 
heritage; third, stopping the growth of government; fourth, resistance to Communism; and fifth, a 
conviction that the Republic was in moral decline. Pathos figured prominently in Goldwater’s 
acceptance speech to the 1964 Republican convention, 
Failure proclaim lost leadership obscure purpose, weakening wills, and the risk of inciting 
our sworn enemies to new aggressions and to new excesses ... We have lost the brisk pace 
of diversity and the genius of individual creativity. We are plodding at a pace set by 
centralised planning, red tape, rules without responsibility, and regimentation without 
recourse ... Tonight there is violence in our streets, corruption in our highest offices, 
aimlessness among our youth, anxiety among out elders and there is a virtual despair 
amongt the many who look beyond material success for the inner meaning of their lives 
(Goldwater 1964b)  
Central to pathos was Goldwater’s conviction that the crisis confronting the Republic was existential. 
Goldwater’s ‘extreme’ language was an attempt to convince through lingustic clarity and so extreme 
language was used to draw a stark, unequivocal position at the expense of logos. Logos can obscure  
meaning  so ‘what is written must be easy to read and easy to speak ... A long sequence of 
connections does not have this feature ...’ (Aristotle 2004, 226). As important as clarity is propriety 
because a ‘fitting style makes the matter persuasive’ (Aristotle 2004, 229)  by bringing the speaker’s 
argument and character together in the text and its delivery. Goldwater relied on ethos, which 
combines both the speaker’s reputation with a distinct message. Goldwater’s ethos was as a man of 





individualism’ (see Hammerback 1972, 175-183) and his insistence that his ideas, often seemingly 
complex could be, and should be, understood as common sense. Complex problems, Goldwater 
insistend, did not require complex solutions. Central to ethos, then, was propriety (correct conduct, 
fitness of purpose, conformity with principle) whereby Goldwater associated himself, and was 
associated, with virtue and the highest motivations, and his opponents with the opposite. Thus, he 
told his audience when he announced his candidacy, 
I’ve been spelling out my position now for 10 years in the Senate and for years before that 
in myown state. I will spell it out even further in the months to come. I was one asked what 
kind of Republican I was. I replied that I was not a “me-too” Republican. That still holds. I 
will not change my beliefs to win votes. I will offer a choice not an echo. This will not be an 
engagement of personalities. It will be an engagement on principles (Goldwater 1964c).  
A notable feature of Goldwater’s rhetoric was his reluctance to use personal experiences, such as his 
war record, rank as a reserve airforce brigadier-general, or his business career because to do so 
would detract from the emphasis on ideas and philosophy. The difficulty was that Goldwater’s 
character was a double-edged sword. Goldwater saw himself as promoting a conservative 
revolution. This was reflected in the language and construction of his speeches; his persona 
sometimes promoted his objectives and sometimes got in the way, which was where a professional 
campaign and communications team would have helped. His overwhelming desire to articulate and 
communicate a message of crisis and persuade people of this truth and act accordingly, coupled to 
his fear of the consequences of not acting meant ‘He was often an inept campaigner, irritable and 
impatient’ (Middendorf 2006, ix).  
Goldwater’s logos stressed the intimate relationship between liberalism, government growth and 
the loss of individual freedom, which led to the inevitable conclusion that all government culminated 
in socialism and the dominance of a bureaucratic elite. Attributes such as private property, social 





constitutional order working properly and effectively. Logos, however, was the least important 
aspect of Goldwater’s speeches. For Goldwater, the proof of his arguments were self-evident and 
did not need to be demonstrated formally and in consequence his style often came across as 
assertive, with an unclear chain of reasoning that relies on enthymemes. As assertions not relying on 
proofs, the enthymeme can provoke a powerful response from audiences and points to the 
significance of self-persuasion by auditors; Goldwater rarely uses evidence or proofs and he 
depended on his listeners ‘filling in the gaps’ from their own experiences to validate his argument. 
Goldwater’s speeches, especially the set-piece major ones, avoid the passive voice. Rhetorically the 
passive voice allows the speaker to state something without specifying who was responsible for the 
state of affairs being addressed, whereas Goldwater identifies the actors (liberals) and their 
motivation (socialism), thus specifying cause and effect.  In his acceptance speech Goldwater made 
extensive use of the phrase, ‘And I needn’t tell you’, then immediately reminding the audience of his 
point.  This reinforced the intimacy of the link between Goldwater and his audience and reiterated 
the route by which the United States reached its current impasse by providing an opportunity to 
reminds his audiences of his major claims. Goldwater’s argumentation is deductive, his premises 
self-evident. Goldwater’s logos rests on enthymemes with the speaker supplying what Aristotle 
called the topoi, the commonplaces, to complete the argument.  
Topoi play a critical role in political rhetoric. Aristotle wrote commonplaces were‘about the possible 
and impossible, and try to show ... that something will happen and in others that it has’ (Aristotle 
2004, 185). A commonplace is a line of argument and categories that identify relationships between 
ideas and help forge a group identity. Topoi represent shared knowledge, knowledge common to a 
community, and they assume a large store of common cultural capital and symbols that define and 
encapsulate a particular understanding of the world. Topoi enable a speaker to make assumptions 
about the knowledge common to an audience and that enable them to fill in the gaps in the 





In Charlotte he gave an academic monologue on the great American system of checks and 
balances – before angrily denouncing the silent crowd for their indifference to their own 
liberty ... In Memphis and Raleigh Goldwater chastised farmers for even thinking they liked 
cotton subsidies ... In West Virginia, he called the War on Poverty ... a fraud ... In the land 
of the tar-paper shack, the gap-toothed smile and the open sewer .. the message just 
sounded perverse. As he left lines of workmen jeered him (Perlstein 2009, 430-31).  
Arguments were often not developed to persuade, but rather to re-state a conclusion. Where 
audiences were already convinced there was no problem; where they were not Goldwater faced 
serious problems. Two episodes suggested what Goldwaterism might have achieved rhetorically and, 
ironically, neither involved Goldwater. 
The first grew out of Goldwater’s mid-October 1964 speech at the Mormon Tabernacle in Salt Lake 
City, which led to a made-for-tv documentary, Choice, produced by sympathetic Hollywood experts 
and Mothers for a Moral America, narrated by Raymond Massey and featuring John Wayne. 
Goldwater had started to develop a morality theme in his speeches in response to events (such as 
the Bobby Baker and Walter Jenkins scandals) and growing social unrest, and this morality theme 
was to be central to the culture wars that developed in the late-1960s/early-1970s. This moralistic 
strand was linked intimately to the theme of national decline. Inspired by F. Clifton White, Choice 
(https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=xniUoMiHm8g) showcased liberal judges, juvenile and other 
crime, riots, law and order, strippers, drugs, pornography, and the growing lack of personal 
responsibility as the direct result of liberalism. It also featured an unseen driver speeding and tossing 
beer-cans from the car, something LBJ was known to do on his ranch. However, no attempt was 
made to blend these into a rhetorical strategy and Choice, due to be broadcast on 22 October, was 
pulled when journalists obtained a copy and Goldwater, chastened by accustations of racism, vetoed 
it. Copies were shown to enthusiastic audiences in Republican campaign headquarters across 





theme emerged from ‘The Forgotten American’ (1961) remained underdeveloped in 1964. It was, 
however, a major bathetic appeal that was picked up by Nixon (‘the silent majority’) and Reagan in 
his hostility to the counter-culture as governor of California after his election in 1966. 
The second example is Ronald Reagan’s, ‘Time for Choosing’, also known as ‘The Speech’, delivered 
on tv in support of Goldwater on 27 October 1964. Its effect on both the campaign and Reagan’s 
political prospects was dramatic (Ritter 1968, 50-58).  There was little ideological difference between 
Reagan and Goldwater but ‘The Speech’ shows the importance of propriety and ethos and also of 
effective delivery. ‘A Time for Choosing’ is the speech Goldwater could not give. The Speech was the 
subject of a major controversy in the Goldwater campaign that went to the heart of Goldwater’s 
rhetorical strategy between those who wanted him to return to his tried and tested themes and 
those who felt to do so drew too much attention to his extremist image.  Goldwater was initially 
inclined to ban the speech but he was persuaded to listen to it and concluded, ‘What the hell 
wrong’s with that?’ (Middendorf 2006, 207).  It evoked a massive positive response.  
In a sense ‘The Speech’ signals the demise of Goldwaterism because, contrary to Goldwater’s 
approach, it demonstrated that it did really matter who spoke and how. Ideas and conviction were 
not enough. Goldwater was perceived to lack positivity and whilst he could identify what 
conservatives should oppose Ronald Reagan giving is listeners a positive message and something to 
believe in, as well as conveying the impression of a winner. 1964 and the preceding years had 
established conservatism’s attractiveness, the problem now was to make it acceptable to the wider 
electorate (Ritter 1999, 340). Goldwater helped create a new Republican audience but his persona 
and the media blocked its penetration; Reagan added a persuasiveness as well as a positive and 
attractive political persona to Goldwater’s message that translated ideology into behaviour and 
support. Goldwater’s persona worked for conservatives who already endorsed Goldwater’s message 







At the 1964 Republican convention Theodore White reported hearing a journalist expostulate during 
Goldwater’s acceptance speech, “My God, he’s going to run as Barry Goldwater.” In so doing 
Goldwater seemingly ignored the basic tenets of campaigning, effective rhetoric and spatial theories 
of politics and these failures ‘appeared to be so immense and obvious’ (Hammerback 1999, 323).  
The impact of Goldwater’s oratory suggests that neither the influence of rhetoric nor its 
effectiveness requires a high level of technical competence or skill as Goldwater was widely 
acknowledged to be a ‘poor’ speaker, particularly in the 1964 presidential campaign.  Even a cursory 
study of Goldwater’s political rhetoric inevitably draws our attention to the power of ideas and the 
significance of pathos. From the perspective of campaigning practicalities his rhetoric prompts a 
further observation: was Goldwater’s objective in 1964 movement-building rather than winning 
office? His campaign rhetoric left a major ideological legacy, which was his intention, which leads to 
the inevitable question: was Goldwater’s campaign one of the most consequential in American 
electoral history? 
Three conclusions followed from Goldwater’s thinking: first, individuals are unique; second, the 
economic and spiritual cannot be separated; and third, human development cannot be externally 
directed. Human development requires the widest possible freedom of choice, and so any form of 
collectivism should be resisted. The bulwark against tyrrany was the Constitution but this had been 
under attack for decades and freedom was now seriously circumscribed and liberty jeopardised. 
Goldwater described freedom to Bozell as ‘the one hope and desire of all the people’ (Dean and 
Goldwater 2008, 111; Goldwater 1962b, 17540). 
There is nothing particularly unusual about the way in which Goldwater’s speeches were composed. 
As a senator and presidential candidate Goldwater made extensive use of speechwriters and most 
day-to-day speeches either were variations of speeches made or were extemporaneous and event 





formal set pieces composition was more formal and some of these speeches (notably the 1964 
convention speech) had a massive, but not invariably positive, impact. This points to the role of the 
media in framing. 
Goldwater’s strategic aim, style, the press’s reporting and interpretation of his rhetoric, the 
radicalism of his ideas, and often amateur scheduling and organisational errors, and the political 
skills of LBJ and the Democrats located Goldwater’s rhetoric in an unusually complex context. This 
resulted in his crushing electoral defeat but the eventual triumph of his ideas in the mouths of 
others. Ronald Reagan’s ability to transform these ideas into a winning formula and Reagan’s success 
suggests that, first, Goldwater was before his time and that conservatism’s success needed events to 
‘prove’ him and his arguments right; and second, that whatever the private personal qualities of the 
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Table 1 Goldwater’s rhetoric. Top 30 Words 
Word Count Weighted Percentage 
government 281 0.72 
federal 210 0.54 
people 206 0.53 
freedom 151 0.39 
american 139 0.36 
states 124 0.32 
should 120 0.31 
political 117 0.30 
communist 114 0.29 
united 100 0.26 
soviet 90 0.23 
economic 89 0.23 
rights 88 0.23 
national 80 0.21 
policy 80 0.21 
individual 74 0.19 
public 74 0.19 
nation 73 0.19 
president 72 0.18 
against 70 0.18 
nations 66 0.17 
republican 63 0.16 
constitution 62 0.16 
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education 61 0.16 
foreign 61 0.16 
senate 59 0.15 
spending 59 0.15 
cannot 58 0.15 
america 57 0.15 
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